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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
P e t i t i o n e r , i 
V . J 
WILLIAM SILAS CASE, 1 
Respondent* \ 
i Case No. 870178 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTEP FQR REVIEW 
The primary q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d for review i s whether 
t h e d e c i s i o n of the c o u r t of appea l s i s in c o n f l i c t w i th S t a t e v . 
Chapman. 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , which h e l d , in p e r t i n e n t 
p a r t , t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t had not abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
admit t ing the pre l iminary hear ing te s t imony of a key p r o s e c u t i o n 
w i t n e s s who did n o t appear for t r i a l , even though the p r o s e c u t i o n 
had not u t i l i z e d the "Uniform Act t o Secure the Attendance of 
W i t n e s s e s from Without a S t a t e in Criminal Proceed ings" 
( h e r e i n a f t e r "Uniform A c t " ) * in i t s e f f o r t s t o s e c u r e the 
w i t n e s s ' s a t t e n d a n c e . I n t e g r a l t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t h e fur ther 
q u e s t i o n of whether the lower c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n i s in c o n f l i c t w i t h 
S t e t e Y» BrCPKSr 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) , and Ohio v . R o b e r t s , 
448 U . S . 56 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , which ruled t h a t admiss ion of an u n a v a i l a b l e 
w i t n e s s ' s p r e l i m i n a r y hearing te s t imony does n o t v i o l a t e a 
1
 The Uniform Act i6 c u r r e n t l y c o n t a i n e d in UTAH CODE ANN. S 7 7 -
21 -1 £ t fi£ii- (1982) . 
defendant's r ight of confrontat ion under the s t a t e and federal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The secondary quest ion presented for review i s whether 
the lower court incorrect ly treated defendant's search and 
se i zure i ssue in the context of remanding the case for r e t r i a l , 
when a proper appl icat ion of Chapman would not require a r e t r i a l . 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals in State v» Case, 
55 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 3 , p.2d (Ct. App. 1987) , appears as 
Appendix A to t h i s p e t i t i o n . A copy of that c o u r t ' s order 
denying the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for rehearing appears as Appendix B. 
JVfilSPICTIQN 
The lower c o u r t ' s opinion was f i l e d on April 15 , 1987 
(Appendix A) . On May 1 1 , 1987, an order denying the S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n tor rehearing was issued (Appendix B) . The S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n for rehearing t o l l e d the period in which t h i s p e t i t i o n 
for c e r t i o r a r i had to be f i l e d , R. Utah S. Ct. 4 5 ( c ) ; there fore , 
the p e t i t i o n i s timely f i l e d . This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to 
review the d e c i s i o n of the court of appeals by a writ of 
c e r t i o r a r i under UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1986) . 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTESr ANP RULES INVOLVED 
1 . U.S. CONST, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
-2-
and to have the Assistance of counsel for h is 
defence. 
2. UTAH CONST, art. I, S 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. SS 77-21-3 (1982): 
Procedure to secure attendance of witness 
from without state. If a person in any 
state, which by its laws has made provision 
for commanding persons within its borders to 
attend and testify in criminal prosecutions, 
or grand jury investigations commenced or 
about to commence, in this state, is a 
material witness in a prosecution pending in 
a court of record in this state, or in a 
grand jury investigation which has commenced 
or is about to commence, a judge of the court 
may issue a certificate under the seal of the 
court stating these facts and specifying the 
number of days the the witness will be 
rehired. The certificate may include a 
recommendation that the witness be taken into 
immediate custody and delivered to an officer 
of this state to assure his attendance in 
this state. The certificate shall be 
presented to a judge of a court of record in 
the county in which the witness is found. 
If the witness is summoned to attend and 
testify in this state he shall be tendered 
such sum as may be required by the laws of 
•3-
the state in which the witness is found, not 
exceeding the sum of 20 cents a mile for each 
mile by the ordinary traveled route to and 
from the court where the prosecution is 
pending and $30 for each day that he is 
reyuried to travel and attend as a witness. 
A witness who has appeared in accordance with 
the provisions of the summons shall not be 
required to remain within the state a longer 
period of time than the period mentioned in 
the certificate unless otherwise ordered by 
the court* If the witness, after coming into 
this state, fails without good cause to 
attend and testify as directed in the 
summons, he shall be punished in the manner 
provided for the punishment of any witness 
who disobeys a summons issued from a court of 
record in this state. 
4. Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5): 
(a) Definition of unavailability. 
•Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the 
proponent of his statement has been unable to 
procure his attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
5. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1): 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following 
are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as 
a witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition 
taken in compliance with law in the course of 
the same or another proceeding, if the party 
against whom the testimony is now offered, 
or, in a civil action or proceeding, a 
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop the testimony 
by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary gt Proceedings Below 
Respondent, William Silas Case, was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-103 (1978) (R* 5). After a jury trial, he was found guilty 
of that offense (R. 42). The court sentenced him to a term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 43)• 
On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed 
defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on 
the ground that defendant's constitutional right of confrontation 
had been violated when the trial court ruled that the 
prosecution's chief witness was unavailable for trial and then 
admitted that witness's preliminary hearing testimony. ££&£, 55 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 64 (Appendix A). The State's petition for 
rehearing was denied without comment (Appendix B ) . 
B. Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review 
Because the testimony of the State's key witness, 
Suzzanne McPerrson (the victim of defendant's aggravated 
assault) , does not appear in the trial transcript (T. 31), or any 
other part of the appellate record,2 the State is unable to set 
forth, by reference to the record, the essential facts of the 
crime of which defendant was convicted. However, given that 
defendant carries the burden on appeal to demonstrate that 
reversible (as opposed to harmless) error occurred, State v. 
2
 The tape recording of McPerrson's preliminary hearing testimony 
was played at trial; however, that testimony has not been 
transcribed for appeal, nor has the recording (State's Exhibit 
40) been made a part of the record on appeal. 
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), and that one of his 
assignments of error requires no detailed recitation of the 
facts, it is sufficient to state that this prosecution and 
conviction arose out of an incident that occurred at the Oquirrh 
Motel in Lakepoint, Utah on February 6, 19 86, wherein a bloodied 
and battered McPerrson ran nude from a room that she occupied 
with defendant (T. 47-63) . 
In the trial court, the State presented the following 
evidence of its efforts to secure the attendance of McPerrson at 
trial. Sherry Brown, a legal secretary with the Tooele County 
Attorney's Office, personally served a subpoena on McPerrson for 
the preliminary hearing while McPerrson was in a local hospital 
shortly after the crime. After McPerrson had testified at the 
preliminary hearing, Brown verbally informed her of a tentative 
trial date, with the understanding that McPerrson would shortly 
thereatter give the county attorney's office an address to which 
a "reminder" subpoena could be sent. Subsequently, McPerrson 
contacted the county attorney, and a subpoena was sent to her in 
Mobile, Alabama. McPerrson acknowledged receipt of the subpoena 
four days after it was sent in a telephone conversation with 
Brown. During that conversation, Brown reviewed the date and 
location of the trial with McPerrson and received assurances from 
her that she would attend. In the following weeks before trial, 
Brown talked with McPerrson approximately eight times about the 
trial, each time receiving a commitment from McPerrson that she 
would attend voluntarily. It was not until the morning of trial 
that Brown learned from a police officer that McPerrson would not 
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be appearing. The o f f i cer had received a long distance phone 
c a l l from McPerrson that morning, in which McPerrson indicated 
that she would not be a t t r i a l because "she was afraid of the 
defendant in the matter and • . . couldn't bring herse l f to come 
in" (T. 14-19 , 21 -24 ) . F i n a l l y , the prosecutor did not u t i l i z e 
the Uniform Act in h i s e f f o r t s to secure McPerrson9s attendance 
(T. 3 ) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT A 
PROSECUTION WITNESSfS PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TESTIMONY WAS ADMITTED AT TRIAL WITHOUT THE 
NECESSARY FINDING OF UNAVAILABILITY AND IN 
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANTS RIGHT OF 
CONFRONTATION IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS 
OF THIS COURT AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT. 
In t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s , de f endant argued t h a t , because 
the prosecutor had not made r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t s t o s e c u r e Ms. 
McPerrson's a t tendance a t t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t had e r r o n e o u s l y 
ru led t h a t she was u n a v a i l a b l e as a w i t n e s s for the purpose of 
admit t ing her pre l iminary hearing te s t imony pursuant t o Utah R. 
E v i d . 8 0 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) and ( b ) ( 1 ) . B r . of App. a t 1 1 - 1 4 . 
Although the lower c o u r t acknowledged t h e e f f o r t s of 
the p r o s e c u t o r , and even c h a r a c t e r i z e d them as "thorough and in 
good f a i t h , " i t reversed d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n because (1) the 
p r o s e c u t o r , by not u t i l i z i n g the Uniform A c t , f a i l e d t o 
demonstra te McPerrson's u n a v a i l a b i l i t y , and (2) " I t l h e use of an 
audio tape of p r i o r te s t imony w i t h o u t c o r r o b o r a t i o n depr ived 
d e f e n d a n t of b i s r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n under t h e 6th Amendment 
of the U.S . C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e I S e c t i o n 12 of the Utah 
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State Const i tut ion*" £La££# 55 Utah Adv. Rep. at 64 . This two-
pronged holding i s in c o n f l i c t with contro l l ing authority from 
t h i s Court and the United Sta tes Supreme Court. 
In State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 19 81) , t h i s 
Court c l e a r l y s e t forth the law appl icable to the admission of an 
unavai lable w i t n e s s ' s preliminary hearing testimony a t t r i a l : 
Defendants r ight to confrontat ion i s 
guaranteed by the Utah Cons t i tu t ion , A r t i c l e 
I , Sect ion 1 2 , and by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Cons t i tu t ion . 
In the context of federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
law f the court in Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 
56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) , 
(hereinafter Roberts) out l ined a two-pronged 
t e s t to determine the admission of prior 
testimony in re la t i onsh ip to confrontat ion 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The f i r s t requirement i s 
that the witness must be unavai lable; the 
second requirement i s that the testimony must 
bear s u f f i c i e n t ind ic ia of r e l i a b i l i t y to 
permit i t s introduct ion at t r i a l . Mancusi v. 
££U]2fcSL# 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 38 
L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Put ton v. Evans. 400 U.S. 
74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970); 
Barber v. Paue. 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 
20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); Pointer v. Texas. 380 
U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 
(1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 u.s. 
237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). S&S. 
AL&£ State Vt Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 p. 542 
(1899) . 
A s t a t e may construe i t s own 
c o n s t i t u t i o n more narrowly than the federal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n even though the prov is ions 
involved may be s i m i l a r . Nonetheless , the 
two-pronged t e s t in Roberts appears to be a 
correct and reasonable standard to t h i s 
Court. 
In State V, PnisKPr# 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 
P.2d 929 (1973) , we held that the testimony 
of an unavai lable wi tness g iven at the 
preliminary hearing could be used at t r i a l 
provided prosecutor ia l a u t h o r i t i e s have made 
a good f a i t h e f f o r t to obtain h i s presence a t 
t r i a l . The rule of review enunciated in 
- 8 -
Gaileggs v> Jinnex* Utah, 526 P.2d 1128 
(1974) , i s that we w i l l not reverse the 
ruling of the t r i a l judge that the e f f o r t s 
were made in good f a i t h in the absence of a 
showing of c l ear abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 
63B P.2d at 539. These standards apply regardless of whether the 
ana lys i s proceeds under the s t a t e and federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s or 
under Utah R. Evid. 804. Brooks. 638 P.2d at 541-42 (holding 
that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l analys i s applied equally under former Utah R. 
Evid. 6 3 ( 3 ) , a rule comparable to current Rule 8 0 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) ) . £££ 
general ly 4 J . Weinstein & Berger, WeinStein'S Evidence S 
804(a) 111 at 47-56 (1985) (summarizing federal case law defining 
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y under Fed. R. Evid. 8 0 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) ) . 3 
In holding that "the prosecutor did not make use of the 
'reasonable means9 required to meet the d e f i n i t i o n of 
' u n a v a i l a b i l i t y , , " £&££, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. at 64, the court of 
appeals nei ther stated nor applied the applicable standard of 
review, and made no e f f o r t to d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s case from State v. 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982) , which appears to require a 
result different from the one reached below. Under Brooks, the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s determination of unava i lab i l i t y w i l l not be 
reversed absent "a showing of £±SJJL abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . " 638 
P.2d at 539 (emphasis added). When that standard i s applied in 
3 This Court has never construed Rule 804 (a ) (5 ) ; however, i t has 
made c lear t h a t , in accordance with the intent of the advisory 
committee for Utah's new rules of evidence, i t w i l l "lookN to 
the in terpre ta t ions of the federal rules by the federal courts to 
aid in interpret ing the Utah r u l e s . " State v . Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) ( c i t i n g State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 
1317 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ) . The Court has discussed Rule 804(b)(1) in 
only one c a s e , gee White Pine Ranches v . Osguthorpe, 731 P.2d 
1076, 1078-79 (Utah 1986) . 
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conjunction with the holding of Chapman, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to find 
any abuse of d i s c r e t i o n in defendant's c a s e , l e t alone a c lear 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . In Chapman, the Court, indicat ing that 
there was no i n f l e x i b l e requirement that the Uniform Act be 
u t i l i z e d as a condi t ion precedent to the use of prior testimony, 
held that the t r i a l court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in ruling 
that an o u t - o f - s t a t e wi tness was unavai lable and that h i s 
preliminary hearing testimony was admissible when the witness had 
acknowledged r e c e i p t of a subpoena in the mail and the prosecutor 
had no reason to quest ion h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y prior to seven days 
before t r i a l * S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Court s ta ted: 
We find that the t r i a l court did not err 
in determining that the second w i t n e s s , 
Richard S c o v i l l e , was "unavai lable ." Upon 
rece ip t of the Utah subpoena, S c o v i l l e 
aff ixed h i s s ignature to the l i n e which 
acknowledged h i s rece ip t of the subpoena and 
h i s in tent ion to comply with i t . When 
S c o v i l l e f i r s t contacted the county attorney 
on February 26 he said he would attend the 
t r i a l . Because of these responses , the s t a t e 
had no reason to quest ion S c o v i l l e * s 
a v a i l a b i l i t y prior to seven days before 
t r i a l . After learning l a t e on February 26 
that S c o v i l l e would not attend and f a i l i n g in 
the ir attempts to contact S c o v i l l e 1 s employer 
on February 26 the s t a t e had only f ive days 
to implement the Uniform Act . While i t i s 
p o s s i b l e to imagine more concerted e f f o r t s by 
the s t a t e to secure voluntary compliance, we 
hold on these t a c t s that the court did not 
abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in determining that the 
s t a t e acted in good f a i t h in attempting to 
secure S c o v i l l e 9 s attendance at t r i a l . 
655 P.2d a t 1123-24. In comparison, the S t a t e ' s e f f o r t s in 
defendant's case were far more concerted than those at i s sue in 
Chapman, and the prosecutor had no reason to be l i eve that 
McPerrson would not appear u n t i l the day of t r i a l , as opposed to 
- 1 0 -
the five days1 notice received in Chapman, Although the court of 
appeals stated that it "believeId] the permissive use of the 
Uniform Act should continue to be the norm in Utah," £a£L£# 55 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 64, its conclusion that McPerrson was not 
unavailable because the prosecutor failed, with extremely short 
notice, to implement the Uniform Act, effectively guts the 
holding of Chapman in favor of a most inflexible rule which 
requires use of the Uniform Act in nearly all cases. ££. &1S±£L 
v. Gray. 616 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. App. 1981) (cited in Chapman. 655 
P.2d at 1123, as authority contrary to the rule adopted by this 
Court). 
The lower court avoided the Chapman holding c i t ed above 
by alluding to the following language in that case : 
When, however, the s t a t e rece ives a c l ear 
message that the witness i s aware of the 
noncompulsory e f f e c t of the subpoena and that 
the witness intends not to comply, for 
whatever reason, the s t a t e must e i ther take 
addit ional s teps to secure voluntary 
compliance, with appropriate assurances, or 
resort to the more compulsory avenues offered 
by the Uniform Act. Half-hearted l a s t minute 
e f f o r t s , as here , to confirm a wi tness 1 
in tent ion not to comply are i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
demonstrate good f a i t h and override the 
d e f e n d a n t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r igh t s of 
confrontation at t r i a l . 
655 P.2d at 1123. I t concluded that the prosecutor had "a c lear 
message" that McPerrson would not appear because of her 
•lifestyle and nomadic habits," "the distance the victim would 
have to travel to appear," and "[hler financial condition [which] 
evidenced a distinct lack of funds with which to travel." ££&£# 
55 Utah Adv. Rep. at 64. It is not at all clear upon what record 
evidence the court based these conclusions. The State is unable 
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to find anything in the record to ind ica te that e i ther f inances 
or d i s tance of t rave l were an obvious impediment to McPerrson's 
appearance a t t r i a l , or that the prosecutor should have known 
that they were.* Furthermoref the only bas i s in the record for 
concluding that McPerrson had "nomadic habits" i s defendant's 
testimony that she had indicated to him some d i f f i c u l t i e s with 
other truckers from whom she had received r ides and defense 
c o u n s e l ' s statement prior to t r i a l that the prosecution knew at 
the time of preliminary hearing that McPerrson had not had a 
permanent address for over e ight years (T. 3 - 4 , 147-49) . 
Counsel 's unsubstantiated statement concerning McPerrson's lack 
of a permanent address should not be evidence upon which a 
factual conclus ion r e s t s . £&£. S tate v. Erwin. 101 Utah 365, 120 
P.2d 285, 313 (1941) (remarks by counsel during opening statement 
to the jury are not ev idence ) . And, to the extent that i t may be 
inferred from defendant's testimony that McPerrson was 
hitchhiking with truckers as she traveled around the country, 
Case. Utah Adv. Rep. at 64, i t cannot f a i r l y be assumed from t h i s 
l imited evidence that McPerrson was a "career" hi tchhiker or had 
such nomadic tendencies that she could not reasonably be trusted 
to appear vo luntar i ly a t t r i a l . The extent or purpose of her 
trave l was never e s tab l i shed in the record below. In sum, the 
court appears to have arrived a t conclus ions of fact based on 
speculat ion about matters outs ide the t r i a l court record— 
* Defendant did not argue t h i s on appeal or at t r i a l . Moreover, 
normally the prosecutor 's o f f i c e pays for the trave l and lodging 
of an o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s . Indeed, S 77-21-3 requires that the 
witness be paid for t rave l and time expended. 
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something t h i s Court has indicated an appel la te court should not 
do. State V» Bingham. 684 P.2d 43 f 46 (Utah 1984) (the Court 
cannot rule on matters outside the t r i a l court record); State v. 
£pjaJLk£, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah 1983) . 
The second prong of the lower c o u r t ' s holding, which 
i d e n t i f i e d a r ight of confrontation v i o l a t i o n , £a££.r 55 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 64 , i s perhaps more d i s turbing . On appeal, defendant 
raised no i ssue concerning e i ther the propriety of using an audio 
tape of prior testimony or al leged undue re l iance on the taped 
testimony by the jury because i t may have taken the tape into the 
jury room and replayed i t . He l imited h i s argument to an attack 
on the t r i a l cour t ' s ruling concerning u n a v a i l a b i l i t y . Br. of 
App. at 11-14. An appel la te court general ly w i l l address only 
those i s sues presented by a defendant on appeal. £££, e . g . . 
S tate v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 754 n. 3 (Utah 1986) . 
Neverthe less , without q u a l i f i c a t i o n and with no c i t a t i o n s to 
supporting author i ty , the court of appeals s ta ted: 
The use of an audio tape of prior testimony 
without corroboration deprived defendant of 
h i s r ight of confrontation under the 6th 
Amendment of the U.S. Const i tut ion and 
A r t i c l e 1 , Sect ion 12 of the Utah State 
Const i tu t ion . There was nothing and no one 
to confront. It t h i s tape was taken into the 
jury room and was played, there i s an 
addit ional erroneous deprivation of the r ight 
of confrontat ion and an over re l iance on the 
testimony by the jury .5 
5 Again, there i s nothing in the record to ind icate that the tape 
was taken into the jury room and played; the court merely 
speculated that t h i s may have occurred. One cannot discern from 
the record whether the jury even had the equipment necessary to 
play the tape. 
- 1 3 -
Case. 55 Utah Adv. Rep* at 64. These rather broad statements of 
law, which appear to be a primary b a s i s for the c o u r t ' s 
conclus ion that the prosecutor should have u t i l i z e d the Uniform 
Act , c o n f l i c t d i r e c t l y with State V, BlPPkS and QhiP V. Roberts* 
448 U.S. 56 (1980) , which held that preliminary hearing testimony 
of an unavai lable witness may be admitted at t r i a l without 
v i o l a t i n g a defendant's r ight of confrontat ion under the s t a t e 
and federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Neither ftrooks nor Roberts prohib i t s 
the admission of an audio tape in l i e u of a t r a n s c r i p t , or 
excludes the prior testimony i f uncorroborated.6 And, defendant 
did not argue, nor i s there any ind ica t ion in the record, that 
the preliminary hearing suffered from any confrontat ional 
d e f e c t s . F i n a l l y , simply because the prior testimony cons t i tu ted 
the primary evidence against defendant i s of no consequence. 
That was the case in both Brooks and Roberts, j?ee ,aL££ 
California v, Green, 399 u.s . 149 (1970). 
In e f f e c t , the lower court has created a new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule which i s d iametr ica l ly opposed to the one 
adopted by t h i s Court and the United S t a t e s Supreme Court. 
Although an intermediate court of appeals i s c er ta in ly free to 
6 The c o u r t ' s statement that the v i c t i m ' s testimony was 
uncorroborated appears to be incorrec t . F i r s t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to understand how the court could make such a determination 
without knowing the content of her test imony. (As noted in i t s 
opinion, her testimony was not transcribed for purposes of 
appeal . Case, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. at 64.) Furthermore, assuming 
that McPerrson's testimony es tab l i shed that defendant had 
assaul ted her , the testimony of a number of prosecution wi tnesses 
about her physical condi t ion immediately after the inc ident , as 
wel l as evidence of screams beard coming from defendant's motel 
room, would c o n s t i t u t e corroborative evidence (T. 32-39 , 47 -53 , 
58 -63 , 102 -06 ) . & ^ BLXJifiJifi, 638 P.2d at 539. 
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c r i t i c i z e the rul ings of the superior appel late court , pee, e . g . . 
Selby Vt Department of Motor Vehiclesr 168 cai . Rptr. 36, 37-38 
(Cal. App. 1980) , in performing the primary "error-correcting1 1 
function in a two-tiered appe l la te system, i t i s not in a 
p o s i t i o n to overrule superior author i ty , and i t general ly should 
refrain from performing i t s "law-declaring" funct ion in cases of 
great moment. £££ State v. Grawien. 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 
N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. App. 1985)? UTAH CODE ANN. S78-2a-3(3) 
(Supp. 1986) (authorizing c e r t i f i c a t i o n of i s sues to Supreme 
Court)• 
This issue i s substant ia l and mandates intervent ion by 
t h i s Court for several reasons. F i r s t , the lower court has 
ignored contro l l ing authority re la t ing to the applicable standard 
of review and rule of law. Second, i t s d e c i s i o n , i f l e f t 
unreviewed, would create unnecessary and unwelcome confusion on 
two important ques t ions : (1) the scope of a defendant's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight of confrontat ion; and (2) what e f f o r t s are 
required of the proponent of an unavai lable w i tnes s 1 s prior 
testimony to secure the attendance of that wi tness a t t r i a l in a 
criminal case . Third, the dec i s ion marks the f i r s t time an 
appe l la te court in Utah has s p e c i f i c a l l y interpreted the re levant 
provis ions of Utah R. Evid. 804, and that in terpretat ion i s at 
odds with t h i s Court's construct ion of Rule 804's predecessor and 
the pert inent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prov i s ions . F i n a l l y , the apparent 
ease with which the court of appeals moved from the "error-
correct ing" arena into the "law-declaring" arena suggests that 
t h i s Court needs to provide guidance on the ro le of an 
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i n t e r m e d i a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t in a t w o - t i e r e d a p p e l l a t e s y s t e m . 
C o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t o 
t h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m , where t h e r i g h t s of v i c t i m s , 
s o c i e t y f and d e f e n d a n t s — a t s t a k e in d a i l y l i t i g a t i o n i n t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t s — demand c l e a r r u l e s of l a w . 
POINT I I 
REVIEW OF THE LOWER COURT'S RESOLUTION OF 
DEFENDANTS SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE SHOULD 
BE GRANTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH REVIEW OF THE 
PRIOR TESTIMONY QUESTION. 
B e c a u s e t h i s C o u r t shou ld r e v i e w t h e lower c o u r t ' s 
r u l i n g on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e c h a l l e n g e d p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g 
t e s t i m o n y , i t shou ld a l s o r e v i e w t h a t c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s s e a r c h and s e i z u r e i s s u e . A d d r e s s i n g t h e l a t t e r 
i s s u e i n t e r m s of a remand for a new t r i a l was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e i n 
l i g h t of c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y on t h e fo rmer i s s u e — a u t h o r i t y 
t h a t , i f a p p l i e d , would n o t r e q u i r e a r e t r i a l . The lower c o u r t 
s h o u l d have a n a l y z e d t h e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n unde r t h e h a r m l e s s e r r o r 
r u l e . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g a r g u m e n t s , t h e S t a t e ' s 
p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i shou ld be g r a n t e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s o ? / day of May, 19 8 7 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
^6-a^t^B.^Q^c ^*y>~^>^v-k_- ' 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
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1 Although not raised to the briefi, the State 
pointed out ot on] argument that since Dr. Palmar 
abo testified that the baby died from brain swelling 
and that the swelling am* likely resuhad from a 
deliberate violent act, such at amrt shaking, the 
Jury's verdict of conviction can be sustained even If 
Defendant*! arfument as to the meaning of the 
atatute ii accepted. In view of the decision wt 
reach, It b aot necessary to consider this contention. 
y At oral argument. Defendant argued that 
•phytic*] injury" and 'serious phyikal injury' are, 
la effect, two loudly selfetanding and independent 
concepts. According to Defendant, 'physical 
Injury* meant just what eubeectiou 1(b) says it does 
and include* the more expansive concept of 
'impairment/ iy contrast, 'serious physical 
Injury* means just what k sayi and h does not 
include the concept of •Impairment.9 We cannot 
agree. Even though the Legislature did not sperifl-
catty state that the term •physical injury" ai used in 
aabiectioo 1(c) shall be defined in accordance with 
aabfcctkm 1(b), h would be absurd to look to 
Webster** for the definition of •physical injury" at 
used in subsection 1(c) where a specific definition of 
that very term is provided in the immediately prec-
eding subsection of an integrated and carefully 
slrawn statute. This is panicularty true where the 
text introducing the definitions makes dear that the 
definitions are to be used throughout the entire 
statutory section. 
4. Since we reject Defendant's interpretation of the 
atatute, we necessarily find no error in permitting 
the doctor to testify thai the overall impairment of 
the baby's physical condition was, In his opinion, 
lfe*4hreetening-
i . Defendant's boyfriend, James Chad Anderson, 
pleaded guihy to third degree felony child abuse and 
was sentenced to a prison term of not to exceed five 
years. The trial court rarorrtmended that the entire 
the 
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DAVIDSON, Jfjtjfe: 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of 
aggravated assault, a Felony of the Third 
Degree, In the District Court and was sente-
nced to confinement In the Utah State Prison 
for the statutory period. Defendant appeals 
claiming the trial court erred in Emitting 
evidence obtained in a warrantless and unre-
asonable search and seizure. He also claims it 
was error to allow the preliminary hearing 
teatimooy of the absent victim to be used in 
trial. We reverse and remand. 
William Silas Case, a long haul trucker, was 
proceeding east on Interstate Route 80 during 
the carry morning hours of February 6, 1986. 
Severe weather conditions caused him to exit 
the road at a truck atop in Lakepoint, Tooek 
County, Utah. Case subsequently took a room 
at the Oquirrh Motor Inn in Lakepoint under 
the name Bill Freeman. 
At approximately 9:30 p.m. oo the same 
day, the motel's resident manager was telep-
honed by another guest who reported what 
sounded like screaming coming from the room 
registered to Case. The manager contacted 
defendant by telephone and the latter reported 
he had a 'crazy woman* in his room and that 
the manager should contact the police. 
Shortly after the conversation with defendant, 
the victim, Suzzanne McPerrson, appeared in 
the manager's apartment nude and bleeding 
from cuts. The manager and her husband 
rendered first aid to the victim. During this 
time period the police were notified. 
Four members of the Tooele County 
Sheriffs Office responded to the report. 
Defendant met the officers on the second floor 
balcony outside of his room. After ascertai-
ning that defendant wasn't armed and without 
asking his permission nor obtaining a search 
warrant, the officers entered his room and 
obtained evidence. 
The trial record indicates the victim had a 
practice of hitchhiking with truckers as she 
traveled around the country. Upon her arrival 
at the truck stop she contacted defendant by 
CB radio and he gave her shelter in his motel 
loom. Alcoholic beverages were purchased 
and cossttimed by both victim and defendant. 
After a struggle, the victim ran from defen-
dant's room into the manager's apartment. 
She mbecqucntry told one of the officers that 
defendant had tried to kill ber. Defendant 
claimed the victim was attempting atnode 
which be triad to prevent. 
Ms. McPerrson was persooaBy served a 
fwbpoana while in the hoaptuu* She appeared 
assd gave teatimooy at the preliminary hearing. 
At the cosKiuskm of that proceeding, the 
was grvwa a tawtarivt trial date by the 
for the Tooek County 
iCawaaCaV 
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Attorney. The victim left an address and tel-
ephone number in Mobile, Alabama. She was 
mailed a subpoena at the Mobile, Alabama 
address which was acknowledged by telep-
hone. Between the preliminary bearing and 
the date set for trial, the victim contacted the 
secretary approximately eight times. On each 
occasion she indicated a willingness to volun-
tarily appear at trial. On the morning of the 
trial, the victim telephoned and stated she 
would not be present. Because of the victim's 
absence the trial court allowed the cassette 
recording of her preliminary hearing testimony 
to be played before the jury, over the objec-
tion of defense counsel The conviction and 
this appeal ensued. 
The trial record does not contain any info-
rmation concerning the content of the victim's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing other 
than it was played to the jury. The cassette 
was admitted into evidence, likely taken into 
the jury room during deliberation and may 
have been played there as well as during the 
trial. 
The crux of this case can be found in Utah 
R. Evid. 804 (bXO, which permits the reco-
rded testimony of an unavailable witness to be 
used if it was given at another hearing of the 
same or different proceeding and if the opp-
osing party had an opportunity to develop the 
testimony through cross examination. Rule S04 
(*X5) defines 'unavailability' in part as the 
witness being absent and 'the proponent of his 
statement has been unable to procure his att-
endance by process or other reasonable 
Although the Tooele County Attorney's 
Office personally served the victim with a 
subpoena to insure her attendance at the pre-
liminary hearing, that office did not do so for 
the trial. It is not denied that the prosecutor 
attempted to keep dose contact with Ms. 
McPerrson while she was in Alabama during 
the period between the preliminary hearing 
and the trial. A subpoena was sent by mail 
which was acknowledged by the victim. The 
numerous telephone calls all caused Tooele 
County to believe this critical witness would 
appear. But, the prosecutor's mailing of a 
subpoena was not effective service. At his 
disposal wns the Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State 
in Criminal Proceedings, Utah Code Ann. 
177.21-1 it esq. (19€2). Tlus was not 
used. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Suu v. 
CbMpaum, 635 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1*2), 
stated that use of the Uniform Act is permis-
sive. However, that Court also indicated a 
preference for the Uniform Act if the state 
'receives a dear message* that the out-of-
state witness won't comply with the nulled 
subpoena and appropriate assurances to secure 
voluntary compliance might not be effective. 
Here, the state's efforts to ensure the victim's 
attendance at the trial would appear to ha 
thorough and In good faith. The mailed 
subpoena and the numerous telephone coat* 
acts indicate a eoocsra on the part of the 
prosecutor that the witness in fact be present. 
Defendant could oafy be found guOty 
through the victim's testiasony that he stabbed 
her and that she was not in the process of 
trying to end her life. The right of confront-
atioo is most critical in a situation such as 
this. Two conflicting stories are told with 
little or no corroborative evidence available. 
The jury must decide whom to believe. It is 
vitally important that the witness be present 
and subject to cross examination in the pres-
ence of the jury. The use of an audio tape of 
prior testimony without corroboration depr-
ived defendant of his right of confrontation 
under the 6th Amendment of the U. S. Con-
stitution and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution. There was nothing and no 
one to confront. If this tape was taken into 
the jury room and was played, there is an 
additional erroneous deprivation of the right 
of confrontation and an over reliance on the 
testimony by the jury. While we believe the 
permissive use of the Uniform Act should 
continue to be the norm in Utah, this is a 
situation in which the prosecution should have 
used it. Ms. McPerrson's lifestyle and 
nomadic habits make it dear that she posse-
ssed the potential to disappear or refuse to 
appear for trial. The prosecutor was aware of 
the distance the victim would have to travel to 
be present. Her financial condition evidenced 
a distinct lack of funds with which to travel 
On balance, the prosecutor should have been 
wary of this witness despite her telephone 
assurances. The use of the Uniform Act 
would have been the proper procedure to 
apply and, without its use, the prosecutor did 
not make use of the 'reasonable means* req-
uired to meet the d e f i n i t i o n of 
'unavailability/ 
We need not analyze the second prong of 
the test which determines whether the testi-
mony of an absent witness may be admitted. 
We have already determined the victim was 
not 'unavailable', therefore, whether such 
testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability 
is not addressed. StMte v. Brooks, tot VM 
537 (Utah 19S1). 
Because we remand for a new trial, the issue 
of the propriety of using evidence taken from 
the motel room is examined. The State, in its 
appellate brief, concedes there is some ques-
tion whether the evidence obtained in the 
warrantless search of defendant's room should 
have been suppressed pursuant to Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12(g). We agree that there were no 
exigent circumstances present that necessitated 
an entry into the motel room without a star eh 
warrant. Scale v. Harris, 671 P.2d 173, 179 
(Utah 1913). The trial record shows Case was 
on the balcony outside of the room when the 
Far tmm+m Utai Ceis Amttntiim, tmmmM CedsoCe's laaitsiis tsrvles 
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police arrived. He was unarmed and cooper* 
•live. In this situation the officer* should 
have attempted to get defendant*! permission 
to enter,or failing that, obtained a learch 
warrant. We hold that the Motion to Supp-
reat evidence taken from the motel room 
should have been granted. 
We reverie and remand to the District Court 
for a new trial on the matter. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, /udge 
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Plaintiff wi/e OnihJe Dah) Appeals from an 
Industrial Commission denial of her Motion 
for Review of an Order dismissing her daim 
for dependent's death benefits We reverse. 
Plaintiff and the deceased, Steven Bradley 
Dahl, were married in Colorado oo October 
22, 1971. Plaintiff was employed by Frontier 
Airlines and the deceased was unemployed. 
feveral months after the marriage, the dace-
need took employment with Revlon Service, 
Inc. and continued in that employment until 
Ms death. During September of 1979, the 
fpuple moved to Utah to deceased oould 
manage Revlon's local district. Plaintiff was 
able to base out of Salt Lake City and conti-
nued with the airline. Upon arrival in Utah, 
the couple purchased home in Sandy. The 
financing arrangements required a monthly 
mortgage payment of approximately $778.00. 
The deceased suffered a heart attack in Febr-
uary of 1984. This appeared to trigger a 
decline in the marriage relationship. As a 
result, plaintiff departed the family home 
during November of 1984 and returned to 
Colorado. Plaintiff and the deceased maint-
ained telephone contact and would meet when 
the latter harf occasion to be in Denver. 
During January of 1985, the deceased filed 
Complaint for divorce. In March of 1985, 
plaintiffs attorney prepared a Verified 
Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking 
temporary monthly support of $750.00. This 
motion was never heard because the parties 
agreed that the deceased would temporarily 
maintain the mortgage on the family home 
and make payments on the current debt obli-
gations of the couple. Subsequently, both 
parties prepared Property Settlement and 
Separation Agreements That of the deceased 
was signed by plaintiff on July 23, 1985, and 
by the deceased and his attorney on July 25, 
1985. In the signed Agreement both parties 
waived alimony, the deceased was to make the 
mortgage payments on the home and pay 
plaintiff for her share of the equity therein, 
the parties were to equally share certain spec-
ific debt obligations, and the various personal 
property was distributed. The stipulation was 
filed with the District Court after Mr. Dahl's 
death which he met in a commercial aircraft 
accident on August 2, 1985, while returning 
from a business trip The deceased'i attorney 
had filed a Certification of Readiness for Trial 
in the District Court, but the matter had not 
been heard at the tune of Steven Dahl's death. 
The hearing record reveals the parties* joint 
income to have been $57,624.00 in 1983 and 
859,286.00 in 1984. In 1984, plaintiffs gross 
income was approximately $20,000.00 which 
reflects the two months she took off because 
of the deceased's heart attack in February of 
that year. During the initial three months 
following plaintiff s return to Denver, she sent 
the deceased $200.00 per month to assist in the 
expenses of the home and the joint debt obli-
gations. These payments were discontinued 
when the deceased filed for divorce. At the 
time the deceased agreed to assume the joint 
debt obligations, these amounted to approxi-
mately $7,000.00, exclusive of the mortgage. 
Utah Code Ann. 135-1-73 (1986) requ-
ires death benefits to be paid to ooe or more 
dependents of the decedent. Section 35-1-
71(2) (1986) contains the presumption that a 
surviving spouse living with the decedent at 
the time of death Is wholly dependent on the 
decedent. However, the same subsection 
states, *P)n all other eases, the question of 
U**Ce*< iCedsoCa'Si 
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Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing heretofore 
filed herein, and the arguments of counsel thereupon had, it is 
ordered that the rehearing be, and the same is, denied. 
Issued: May 11, 1987 
Record: 2 Vols 
